





Anomalies and extremes in surface air temperature in 2024

Data: ERA5 1979–2024 • Reference period: 1991–2020 • Credit: C3S/ECMWF



PROGRAMME OF
THE EUROPEAN UNION



IMPLEMENTED BY



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Śāriputra's trap

1

„Phenomenal Transparency“

A (graded) property of phenomenal representations
only:

- Only **content properties** available to attention, carrier properties invisible.
 - Phenomenology: Realness, immediacy, mind-independence.
 - Phenomenally **opaque states** do exist:
 - Candrakīrti: “...echoes and reflections“
 - Phenomenology: *Virtuality*, representational character, mind-dependence.
- **Unconscious states** are *neither* transparent *nor* opaque.

NEW SERIES. No. 48.]

[OCTOBER, 1903.

MIND

A QUARTERLY REVIEW

OF

PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY



I.—THE REFUTATION OF IDEALISM.

BY G. E. MOORE.

MODERN Idealism, if it asserts any general conclusion about the universe at all, asserts that it is *spiritual*. There are two points about this assertion to which I wish to call attention.



George Edward
Moore

(1873-1958)

„Phenomenal transparency“: *Locus classicus*



G.E. Moore: „transparency“ and „diaphanousness“

„[...] the fact that when we refer to introspection and try to discover what the sensation of blue is, it is very easy to suppose that we have before us only a single term. The term ‚blue‘ is easy enough to distinguish, but **the other element which I have called ‚consciousness‘** – that which a sensation of blue has in common with a sensation of green – is extremely difficult to fix. [...] And in general, that which makes the sensation of blue a mental fact seems to escape us; it seems, if I may use a metaphor, to be **transparent – we look through it and see nothing but the blue; we may be convinced that there is something, but what it is no philosopher, I think, has yet clearly recognised.**“ (1903: 446)

„Phenomenal transparency“: *Locus classicus*



G.E. Moore: „transparency“ and „diaphanousness“

„[...] that the moment we try to fix our attention upon consciousness and to see what, distinctly, it is, it seems to vanish: it seems **as if we had before us a mere emptiness**. When we try to introspect the sensation of blue, all we can see is the blue: the other element is as if it were **diaphanous**. **Yet it can be distinguished if we look attentively enough, and if we know that there is something to look for.**“ (1903: 450)

Application 1

- The “transparent phenomenal self-model”:
- If a system operates under a phenomenally transparent *self-model*, it will by necessity generate the phenomenology of identification and of ownership.
 - Prediction: Opacification will lead to non-egoic self-awareness.
- Special case: “epistemic agent model”

Application 2

→ The “transparent world-model”:

- All-pervading phenomenology of naïve realism.
- Prediction: *Global* opacity is possible.

The PMIR

Dharmakīrti: *antarviplava*

2




Figure 2.2

Good old-fashioned intentionality (GOFI): A subject component (S; the “mental act”) is directed at an object component (O; the “intentional object”). As O does not necessarily exist, GOFI is a non-physical relation.




Figure 2.1

The *phenomenal model of the intentionality relation* (PMIR): A subject component (S; the PSM, an internal, conscious model of the system as a whole,) is phenomenally represented as directed at an object component (O; the “intentional object”). In conscious volition, O always is a *goal component*, for example, an allocentric representation of a successfully terminated bodily action.




Figure 2.3

The *phenomenal model of the intentionality relation* (PMIR): In humans, the subject-component is a phenomenal self-model (PSM), an internal, conscious model of the system *as a whole*. Because the PSM is phenomenally transparent, it is not experienced *as* an internal model. Therefore no homunculus problem arises, and an infinite regress is avoided. In conscious volition, O, the goal component, is represented in a *phenomenally opaque* manner. This means that we are able to phenomenally experience it *as* a self-generated mental simulation, plus to consciously represent the additional fact that we, the organism as a whole, are currently *directed* to it.

One of the key aspects of this model is that it undermines the notion of agency in cognition, even when cognitions are structured by subject-object intentionality. (...) The subject-object structure within the awareness-event creates the illusion that the subject-form is acting as an agent in a transitive action of cognizing the object, but the actual cognitive action is an agent-less, intransitive one in which the awareness-event, which is manifesting with object- and subject-forms, intransitively illuminates or presents itself.





The myth of cognitive agency: subpersonal thinking as a cyclically recurring loss of mental autonomy

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The Problem of Mental Action

Predictive Control without Sensory Sheets

Thomas Metzinger

Metzinger, T. (2017). The Problem of Mental Action - Predictive Control without Sensory Sheets.

In T. Metzinger & W. Wiese (Eds.). *Philosophy and Predictive Processing*: 19. Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: [10.15502/9783958573208](https://doi.org/10.15502/9783958573208)

The Contraction Principle

3


In other words, it is not presented as the object of an intentional structure, even if it is occurring within a dualistic cognition that appears to be about an object. Indeed, from the Dharmakīrtian perspective, an apparently dualistic cognition is actually an awareness-event in which both the object-form and subject-form, which are nothing other than the awareness itself, are simultaneously presented in an intransitive way through reflexive awareness.




Reflexivity: First data-points

RESEARCH ARTICLE

The Minimal Phenomenal Experience questionnaire (MPE-92M): Towards a phenomenological profile of “pure awareness” experiences in meditators

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Factor 8

Factor 8 (“Emptiness and Non-egoic Self-awareness”) may be most interesting from a philosophical perspective. In our study, it refers to an experiential quality of “pure knowing” without a sense of self and without any object. The relevant items describe an uncontracted, unbounded, and non-dual experience of wakefulness without content, which is self-aware, knowing only itself in a way that lacks any markers of egoic self-consciousness like agency, ownership, and autobiographical narrative, or spatiotemporal self-location [27, 30].

Interestingly, the second- and third-strongest loading items in **Factor 8** were those offering two metaphorical descriptions of first-order reflexivity combining the “Self-Knowledge, Autonomous Cognizance and Insight” of **Factor 3** and the “Wakefulness” of **Factor 4** with the phenomenal quality of emptiness and epistemic openness. These are negatively correlated with the phenomenology of selfhood: The phenomenology of self-knowing and self-awakening picked out by this factor is *non-egoic*. Arguably, it is exactly these aspects of **Factor 8** that, for many participants, may express the “spiritual essence” of MPE most directly. Evidence for the actual existence of non-egoic self-awareness in the context of a substantial psychometric study is a theoretically relevant result.

Factor 8

156 This was mostly an experience of emptiness, not as an object, but as emptiness/consciousness cognising itself. There was a lot of clarity (consciousness cognising itself) and a joy that lasted for several days. [...]

1582 [...] It was odd, as I kept experiencing no thoughts, just emptiness, yet it was “fullness” at the same time. The body felt like it dissolved and what was left was my awareness, being aware of itself. [...]

1712 I experienced awareness itself. Not in the sense that I was experiencing awareness; there was no “me”, no “observer”. Awareness itself was always already aware.

2120 [...] Also, I became aware of the fact that “thought” does not have primacy in my experience, rather awareness has the primacy. Thought is occurring in this awareness which is also aware of itself.

- Empirical evidence for the existence of „**non-egoic self-awareness**“.
- Empirical evidence for „**non-egoic units of identification**“.

„Non-egoic self-awareness“

A new phenomenological concept referring to the experience of a **non-egoic signature of self-knowing**:

- The experience of nonconceptually knowing that *knowing is now possible or actually taking place*, phenomenally experienced as **selfless self-knowledge**.
- An experiential quality of **reflexive, non-dual, selfless self-awareness** that involves a dynamic form of **self-certainty**.
- “non-egoic”
Def.:
 - absence of spatiotemporal self-location;
 - no ownership, either mental or bodily;
 - no agency, either mental or bodily;
 - no cognitive self-representation of oneself *as* oneself.

„Epistemic openness“

A new phenomenological concept:

- describing the phenomenal character of MPE on a very **abstract level**.
- A partial, phenomenological reinterpretation of **the Buddhist concept of “emptiness”** (*śūnyatā*).
- A specific form of being open to the world: The experience of openness related to knowledge, to **the *space of possibilities*** related to the acquisition of knowledge, and to the **mere capacity** itself.

→ See also: “epistemic space”

„Epistemic space“


- A set of *possible* states or processes of knowing.
- Different conscious systems, for example human persons and non-human animals with different brains, may open up very different spaces of knowing.
- Speculative claim: If a system has an internal model of its own epistemic space, it becomes conscious, because *it non-conceptually knows about its own capacity to know*, as well as about currently actualized states or ongoing processes of knowing.
- If it also has a phenomenally opaque model of this space in and of itself, the phenomenal character of “pure awareness” appears.

COMMENTARY

 OPEN ACCESS

 Check for updates

Self-modeling epistemic spaces and the contraction principle

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KEYWORDS Consciousness; minimal phenomenal experience; tonic alertness; attentional agency; contraction principle

Call this the “contraction principle”:

(CP) “Phenomenality” is a property of certain integrated, global brain states. The brains of neurotypical human beings *misrepresent* this objectively given property of phenomenality by contracting it into a transparent conscious self-model, which then forms the origin of a first-person perspective.

So, in the intransitive act of illumination, the subject-form is “illuminated” within that awareness-event without being taken as the object in the intentional structure of a cognition. Clearly, this *does not* mean that the phenomenal form of the subject (i.e., the subjectivity) is “knowing itself” as the agent of an action of knowing in which it takes itself as an object. Instead, there is no agent for this reflexive presentation of the subjectivity. (section 5.3)



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